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ABSTRACT 
All over Ihc world there i s  a pconnunccd trend towards privatisingpuhtic 
enterprises on thc ground that i t  is ~ h c  best and pcrhaps the only credible policy 
for improving the pert'or~ni~nce ol'htatc-owncd undertuki~lps. In mosl dcvcloping 
countries priva~isation or rci'orni o f  thc PSEs has become an inevitable 
consequcncc of thcstrudurrl adjustment programme. lndin too has iollowcd 
a palicy o~privatisntion or more rlxcilically a policy of divesting off governmmt's 
sharc holding in o nurnkr of enterprises under its ownership. Rut this policy has 
k e n  poorly articulated and irs implcnlentarion vcry I;~ckadaisicn! in naturc. 
Cnnsequcnlly vcry soon the goverruncnt is going to he left wilh a nurnkr ol^  
poorly performing cli~e~~priscs w,hich will he s drag On i t s  budgct while the bertcr 
pcrforrning and dividvnd paying cnlwprises would havc left i ls  fold. I nrguc that 
a1 the sool of this apparcnt conrradiulicln i s  ~ h c  r ;d rcilsrlri khind the rei'onrr 
process in India. Divestiture is t houyht of  primarily as a mcchuni.cm to generille 
non inflationary h n n  ot' rcscrirrces to !ill i n  the burgeorling fiscal deficit (IT the 
cenrral goverri~ncnt. Impmvinp perfbrmancc has been thc least rd'considern~ions. 
The papcr is structured into threc broad sections. It1 !lie first section I survey 
the various public cr~tetprise ~.clorrn pcrlicicq initiritcd and implemented since 
199 1 .  Thcy are: la) policics which has l i~uscrl on crcaLing tlorncslic cornpctitit~n 
hy elilninaring haniors Ioerltq, strhsidies. pricedislo~fions, and prefercnrial :rccss 
to htfdgi and hatlk I-csoilrccs; (h) policics for improving thc miinaperncnl of 
PSEs by incrcasirig i j r  i~nprr~uimg ~ t ~ o i r  intcr2'acc wi th thcir rcspcctive 
administrative minisiries: (c) policics ~ I I .  indmducing rcstrucluring and for 
establishing a social sal'cty 11ct progrslulne: and ((1) in~plcmcnting sevcrill roands 
al~divesrmcrir. In tht  secund sccliot~ I arguc ttrnr rhe only policy that lias bccn 
imple~ncn~d ill ;I sipr~i f icar~r msnncl- i s  1111: last one. Furthcr in Ihc secfion a 
detailed critique of illis policy i s  provided. In ~h t '  last section I present a c~'itirlue 
of the concept of-soci~rl saf'tty net in the context ot' PSF, reform proccss. 
JEI, Clnssiliautiun: L 32, 33. 
Key 1Yords: Pr~uutisiltrorl. I l i v t ' ~ ~ ~ ~ u r c .  Ptltjlic Sector Entcrprisc Keforn~s. 
Memorandum of Undcrs~;~ndi~~g. Untlerpriuirtg. Social Sal'ety Net. Na~ional 
Rcnewal Fund. Vc~lunti~v 12~rirc1ucnl Sclic~ne. 
The onc major policy shift that has occurrcd in both the developed 
and developins world is the overriding heiief in privatisalion a?: a panacea 
for rhc ills confronting public seclor enrcsprises. The genesis of this belief 
is the comrnonplrtce ohsenration [ha! public enterprises are inefficient 
hause  they address the ahjcctivcs of politicians rather than maximise 
efticiency(Boycko, and Vishny, 1996). If one surveys the trcnd towards 
privazisatio~r across a large number of developing countries, lhe Following 
issues merge: 
(i) Privatisation in devtloping countries has often hccn a necessity 
Following pressures fmm i ntcmillian:ll agencies. Accorrti ng to Ca~npos 
and Esfdhnni(l99h)for most developing countries, econonlic downturn 
may he an ahnost necessary condilion Tor PSE selbrm. The reform of 
the public sector in general or privatisation in panicular i s  an inlegraf 
component of thc struclural adjuslnlcnt progamine which illost ol'these 
counlrics were made ro pursue. This however, hlls no1 included guidelines 
nn how privatisation should be camicd out and the variations hctwecn 
counlrics are suhaandal; 
(ii)As a corollary of the ahovc. the main rationale for privatisation 
is to nix nan-intlationary form of rcvcnuc to fill in the deficits in 
especially the revcnuc budge! ol'thc central governments. According to 
an cs~inlale hy the World Rank approximarely $96 hillion has been miscd 
hy de~cloping cnuntries alone during the peritd I Y  88- 1993' ; and 
(iii) In so far as available evidence makes possihle any firm 
conclusions, [he impact of privatisation on the performance of  enterprises 
has k e n  very varied. Even the principd objeclive of revenue raising 
may no1 always have been achieved. However a recent sludy by 
Meginson et al ( 1994): documents significant i~nprovements achieved 
surprisingly without sacrificing employment security. Their anaIysis 
sowed that, post privatisation, the firms increased their capital investment 
spending, improved ltbeir operating efficiency and increased their work 
force. Funher more, the companies significantly lower their debt levels 
and increase dividend pay out. But most of the firms in their sample 
were from the developed market economies. 
In  thc context, the purpose of thc present paper is to undertake an 
analysisof the public sectorreform process in India scr into motion since 
1991. In keeping with the objective, the p a p  is structured into three 
hrvad sections. In secrion one. I survey the various public scctor reform 
measures and in the second one I attempt at a critique or onc of rhe 
important measures, namely the process ofdiveslment of government's 
equity in a number of specified enterprises. Finally in the last section I 
undertake a critique of  he concept of social safety nct in fhc coniext 
PSE reforms. A[ rhe outset it should he made cleat tllar the scope of our 
discussion is restricted to the public sector enterprises under the ownership 
of thc central government' . 
1 The study cornpmed the pte nnd post privaliwtion financial and operating. p e r ~ o m c e  
of 6 1 co~npnies from18 coun~rim and 32 induaries during the period 1961 thmagh 
1990. 
3 According lo thc &pnmmr of Pliblic En1cqmi~es(1993-94), lh are 146 rton 
deprtnlm~al public wlorcnterprisaq under the ownership of thc Centnl govcrnmnt. 
Sce COF immv Pnge 6. My analysis is lhccfore restricted to t k  enterpriws and 
thwekire dws not incIudc reronns in rla power md relecomn~unifari~ls wtur. 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROCESS IN INDIA 
The refoim process is OF recent origin thoagh fallowing Lhc world- 
wide trend thurc have hccn somc Feehlc attempts nt improving especially 
the inrerface hiween gavernalent and cntcrprises through essentially 
the medium or the Mcmorandurn or lJ~rders~anding(MoUs). Thc fist 
explicit articulation of the dcsirr: to divcst government's equiiy holding 
is to be found in the hudget(inferim) spceuh of 199 1 -92 where in i t  was 
stated thak tlrc central governlnenl wnuld tlivcst of its eqdty holdings in 
a number of its cntelpriscs in favour of mutual funds and financial or 
invesl~nent institutions in the puhlic sactor. This diveslmenl, it was argued. 
would hmd-bsc thc equity. i~nprove management and enhancc thc 
availability of resources for these cntcrpri.ws, was also expeacd lo yicld 
Rs 25000 million to thc exchcquer in that yar, namely in 199 1-92. This 
posidon was suhscquently restiicd in thc new industrial policy statcmen! 
of July 199 1 and the hudgel speech (of the ncw government ) of 199 1 - 
92. In addilien zo thc nblvc l\lentionerl delails it was furlher spccilied in 
thesc dncunrcnks the prccisc cxlcnt of divcslmcnt(which was 20 per cent) 
and that the shares would hc sold not only to  he public financial 
instizutions hut also to thc workers in rhcse cntcrpriws and [he gcnerd 
puhlic. So the slated ohjcctives of divcstt~~enl docs not refer to thc process 
as a means of  inipl.oving t'inuncial periormancc oC dre entcrpriscs. The 
prinrary ohjcc~ivcs wcrc: ( I  ) In 1;dse rcsourccs for lhe budsct which are 
esscntblly non inl1:uiiln;lry in nnturc: (2) broad base the ownership or 
the enterprises which would cvcntually allow the enterprises to raise 
resources [rob11 thc c;~piral nlaskcl and ~hcrehy lower their dcpndcncc 
on hudgetnry support. 
Htlwcvcr lo increasc clTicicncy. productivity. and cornpclitivencss 
of the seclot a nuinhcr or other rncasul.cs were intlhoduced and ii' one 
were to xummarisc thcrn", these were policies which have focused on 
(a) crcat ing internill cornpet ition hy clinlinating cnt ry harriers, subsidies. 
pricc rlistorlions, and prefercnlial acccss to hudgct and hank resourccs; 
(h) improving thc rnnnagelncnl of public entcrpriscs hy increasing 
autonomy and Ihc mandate lo hccoriie profil-o!.icnled ccntl-es; and (c) 
introducing rcaruciuring policics and cstahlishing a soci;rl safety nct 
progrrrtnrnc. The progress todate in thcsc three al.e;ls of reform are mapped 
o u ~  In Table 1. 
Tahle I: Progress of Public Sector Enterprise Reform Programnlc, 
1991- 1996 
Status in 1991 
Cor?rpetitiorl poiicies 
The num bci-of inrlustric\ rescrvcd 
cxulusikcly Ibr Ihe puhIic sectol- 
rctlouurl 1 0  18: 
Ttrc d ircur hudgctary support tcl 
puhtic cnfrrprifcs worked out to 
1.5 per cc111 ( ~ t '  GDI' and they 
wccivctl in ;~rldi!ion a v:u-icry ol' 
I L I ~ ~ I C ~ ~ L ' ~ ; I I I L I S ~ I ~ ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ S C I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  
- - -- 
Progress through 1996 
'l-11~ n u m k r  of indus[rics rel;el.j~cd 
for thl: pllhlic. scclor rcdur;cd lo 6. 
Privale participation in some of 
~hcsc sec1oi.s is also pcrnrirtcd on 
;I ci~sc hy cast htlsis; Thc qucstion 
ol' wilhdrswing the puhric scc~or 
tr'oln non-corc i ~ n d  non-strategic 
;ma.; wilt hc cx;~lnii~cd; 
Thc hutlpc~;~ry suppot t curr;ilcd to 
11.8 pel-ccn! ol' GDP, firlilncing i n  
don~csl iu capilnl iilarkcts incr- 
easud. plvfcl-cntial ;~cccsh to hank 
c r t d~ sc l im~nn~cd ;  
Thc PSls  w hich arc r,per;~~ing in 
co~n~nc~.clal  ai.ci a art. cxpcc~ed to 
pay a niiniinunt dividcnd of20 pel. 
cclll; 
- A 
Sourccs: S .  Adaptcd frorn Tihlc 7.X in Chopra, Ajni et al( 1995). p. 65: 
2. Gova'nmcn~ or India ( 1995-96). p. 1 ! 3 and p. 120; 
3. Deprtincnt ol' Public Enterprises ( 19'-13-94), p. I h0- 16.7; 
4. Unitcd Frotlr(lc39h). 
Management policies 
Direct supervision of public 
enterprises fmn~ government; 
The MoU system was in tduced  
in 1988-89 nod revised i n  989- 
90 to improve ihc pcrlb~mnncc of 
PSEs by bringing ;~hou a plnpcr 
halancc hctwecn accountability 
and autonomy. 
Restructuring policies 
Thc provisions of  lhc Sick 
Induslrial Compan ies(Specia1 
Provisions), 198.5 was amcndcd in 
Dccemhcr, 199 1 to cx~ctld il to 
governrncnt companicc. 47 ccntrill 
PSEs have h e n  rcgis~ercd with 
the BIFR(as on 3 1-3- 199 1 ); 
Thcrc was no ~0~i; i l  safely net of 
any sort for unnnploy~nenl. 
1 now discuss ~ h c  progrcss of thesc various rclbrm nicnsurcs in 
some dc~nil . 
Managerial autonomy marginally 
improved rhrough the MoUs. 49 
signed in 1994-95. Thc financial 
pcrforn~ancc of these cnrcrpriscs 
havc hccn better than what had 
been lnrgcled [or in the MoUs by 
' per 
Up lo the end or March 1995.53 
cascs of central PSEs havc heen 
rcgistcred with BIFR. 
A National Renewal Fund h;rb 
hcen cstahlishcd. But the lotat 
amount under this fund is not 
knc~wn[Sce Scclion i i i  for lhc 
details]; 
Participation of workcrs in thc 
rnanagelncnl ol'pmhl nuking and 
cfficieilt companies wi l l  he 
encouraged. 
An area where much progress has been achieved is in thc area of 
competition policies where the nunlhcr of industries that werecxclusively 
reserved for public sector investment has kcn pmpressively reduccd 10 
6 lion1 18. As of now the only industries where public scclor can have a 
munoply art: dcfcnce prduction, atomic encrgy, w a l  and lignile, rninwal 
oils, railway transporl. and radio active rnalerials. As a result of rhis 
policy sf deregulation public sector now race competition in areas like 
powcr. ~elecornmunication, air transport. oil refining. and mining in 
yrcncml. This coupled with reduction in the budgetary support has furthcr 
pul prcssure un [he cnicrpriscs to he more efficient. A second area of 
reform has k e n  in cCSccting more ~nanageriat autonomy through thc 
medium of  MoUs. According to the Department of Public 
Enrcrpri~e(1993-94). "MoU is an instrumen[ which dcfincs clearly thc 
relationship of PSE with [he governmen1 and clarilics the rcspt ive  
roles 01' the PSEq as wcll as rhe govwnrnenl in order lo achievc bwrcr 
perrormance. If  is alscl an afrernpt ro b r i n ~  a proper hilance between the 
i~ccountahility and autonomy. Thc anphnsis is on achieving the negr~tiaterl 
and aprecd ol~jec~ives rarhcr ~ h a n  in~ctfcring in [he day-to-day i~ffrrirs"~. 
Thc system has hcen in existence since 1988-89 and i t  Rns progt-cssively 
covereti ne;u.ty 40 pcrccnt of the PSEs" . One or (he difricul~rcs with h i s  
exercise has hcen rhc tack of a.cdihlc s;~nutions against he  nianasetnent 
lhat L~i l  ro nice[ commitolents in  an MoU'. Another drawback is the 
conlli~t 01' intere\t inhercnt in an adi~~inistrative ~ninislry rating ant! 
supcrvisin_r the public en~erpriscs lhnr fall undcr its ju~.isilicrioa. In  
h Wit11 this !he enlire p~lhlic scclnrcncc]n 111c ~ i l c r l l r i ~ s  %I-hich we cIironic;~l~y sick or 
nt iniiy~il-nqn! size vmt~ld Iuvt  signed Mol?s wi[A ~ k i r  m-ivc adrrirni~rr;l!iw 
tilini\L1icddc1)ilr[mt'nts. Sm I~P:I~~IIEII[ Public Gitt~-prists( 1'393-94)- p. 16 1 .  
1993-94. for instance, 75 per cent of  he evaluated PSEs were rated 
exceilenr or wry good and only 10 p r  cent werc rutcd fair suggesting 
that the criteria for ralings were not very stringnlR . Thus i t  has run the 
risk of rnercly degenerating into a rnere ndministrafive rimal. I shall 
furlher illustrate this point in the second section lhat the operalional 
prformance of the concerned enterprises have no[ improved signi licantly 
since the introduction of this system. But Ehe approach in principle i s  
sound and can possihl y strengt hcned with mare comprehensive muti layer 
conlracts that further improve incentives, flexibility and, accountcihility. 
Finally rhe last area of reran has been in thc area of restructuring the so 
called sick PSEs. Thc first slcp in his direction wtn to bring the sick 
PSEs undcr [he provisions of  he Sick Industrial Companies Act( STCA). 
The government policy on sick cntcrprises was announced in the new 
industrial policy statement of 199 1 in that, " PSEs which are chronically 
sick and which are unlikely to be turned around will, for the fmula l ion  
ofrevival/ rehahilitarion schemes, be referred to the BIFR or orher similar 
high level instir utions crcalcd ro protect the inlcresl of workers to he 
arfected by such rehabilitation packrtpes". As per the amended SICA. 53 
PSEs beEonging to Ihc central governmen1 were registerccl with thc 
BIFR' . Thcir current sru~us( as on 3 1-03- 1995, thc latest period for which 
such data arc nvailahlel is ouzlincd in Table 2. 
8 A finr criliquc oftlw MoU appmxh is svailnhlc in Sankar, f L (1990), pp. 7 1 -7R. 
9 11 III~~FI he wild out ll~at he R R l  lla'i tonsrirufrrl a small working $map to explorc 
the pssihilirics for csfi~hlishing an indepcntlcnl qmisatiun Torundtrtrking the salc 
a w t s  ul'sivk I'SE.; rccoinmendcd for wlndinp np by thc UIFK. Rut su h r  110 co~icretc 
~ l q w  h:ivc k e n  initialed in ?hi< direction. See K a j a p  Snhh:~ Unstnmd Qur~tion Nu: 
966 rerepond in A~sofham (1996). p, 379, 
8 
Tahle 2: Current Status of Sick PSEs (as on 3 1-03-1995) 
Source: Mohan (1966). p. 78 
Status 
Rccomrncnded li)r widing up 
Winding up Noliccs sel-vctl on 
Revival packagc approved 
Stay oi'procccdings by IIigh Courl 
Cases under enquiry 
Total 
The Tahle shows that not a singlc en~clpl-isc has actually hecn 
clnscd down bcunusc of prolractcd lcgal proceedings. One major 
boltlcncck which hampers progress in I l ~ s  direct~on is thc iihscncc of a 
cicdihlc social safcty nct. Since ~ t i i r ;  issue has hecollw vcry con~cnticlus 
I lakc i I up l'or deiailed d1scu5s1on In  Ihc third scction 11 should however 
he ment~oned thar the hIamc tor having such a Iar2c number of sick 
firm\ d w s  no1 enl~rcly lie with the l~ublic seclor for a I-un thl-ough the l i s t  
of this 47 sl~orvs thnl a rnajol-ity of lllcnl are natic~nali\ed p~ ivatc scctor 
con1panIcs which were nlrcady sick al the llnlc uf'thcir take ovcr. Nccrlltsc 
tu add rel'orms i n  th15 area should also lncludc dcvc lo l~mcn~  of
m c ~ l ~ o c l o l ~ ~ ~ i c ~  1'01 irlen~il'ying lo<r-n-~~kiny e tcl-prises at an  cnrly stngc 
rather than wherl they nl-e already uhmnicnlly sick. 
Number of PSEs 
5 
5 
- 
8 
2 
23 
53 
l7mn rriy hricl' sul-vcy of the PSE rcli~rin measures, tl-ic following 
issues emerge: 
( 1 )  Conside~ahlc hcadwav has bccn marlc in compc1ition pol~crcs. 
N o  doubt rhe~r ullinla~e success will depcnd on the q ~ c d  w i ~ h  which 
private scc to~  untc~'p~'~scs can cnlci. the ncw are,[\ 1I1;1t are now ope11 to 
them and offera credihlc rhreut to PSEs; (2) The syacm of'MoUs rcyuires 
a lhorouph overhauling. I t  could perhaps he strengthened will1 more 
comprehensive ~nulrilayer con tracts that Surlher i~ i~prove  inccnrives, 
Ilexibility, and accounrtlhility ; (3) Some progress has heen acl~iuved in 
identifying chronically sick fi ms hut no Fundamental restrucruring has 
actually taken place cssentiillly because 01'thc ahsence of a credi blc social 
safety net which can actuafty rehabilitate the affcctcd labour in a 
significant manna: 
Bul as argued earliw IIC most significant rcform measitre is rhe 
one relaring lo the divcstnienl ol'sh:rc holding in specified entcsprises. 
I liad also argucd lhat the divcsfment progmmme rnay not actually lead 
to an in~pmvemcnl in thc ct'iic~cncy of llje divested cnrerpriscs becnusc 
in any case they werc thc hes~ pcrforrning cnlerprises in h e  public sector 
port folio: the objective of raising rcvcnue has superseded the objeclive 
of intpmvingcllicieacy. In thc following section I subject this to adctailed 
empirical scrutiny. 
11 
AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA'S D I VESTJTURE PROCESS 
The one rcform mcasure rhat has bcen somewhat consistcnlly 
purswd is ~ h c  divcs~iturc process. Sincc rtlc nlnin objcc~ive ol'this cxcr'cisc 
has been to nisc revcnue this plncess has !rot Icil lo any perlbnnancc 
improvements. 101- anise the discussio11 of' [hi> issuc inlo two subsections. 
First I present a picture 01' the niilurc oC divcsti~ure itself sincc 199 1-92 
and until thc latest onc. This is I'ollowed by an analysis ol'lhe succcss of' 
rhis policy interms or: (a) its ability t o  raisc rcsourcrs for the budget; 
and (h) its eflect oa the financial ~wrtormancc ~Cthedives~ed nlerpl-ires. 
The nature of the divestiture proems 
The process commenced in 199 1-92. Al'ler tnuch discussion, thc 
Depart nient oIRonomic Arhirs rt~ommcndcd the followi~lg p~wcdurc: 
( 1 ) Thc PSEs to be divested wilt he selcctcd by thc Department of 
Puhlic Entrrprises(DPE): (2) The selcctetl cnccrpriscs will hc placed in 
three cntegorics(i) very good, ( i i )  good; and (iii) averagc; (3) 
Bundlcs(haskc!s) consisting of dil'krcnt cotnhinations al' 6 10 9 PSEq 
would hc rnarie including so111c rrum cach or ~ h c  very good, good and 
average catcgorics; (4) Thc criterion to he used tilt classi Vy ing a PSE ;is 
very good, good or averapc was  he PSEs Net Asset Vnluc(NAV) per 
sharc oI' Ks 10- fhce value---very good(NAVof Ra Sot), pood(NAVnF Rs 
20-49) and avcmge(NAVoTKs 10- 19): (5)Thc particular combination in 
cach hundlc would also bc decided by thc DPE"' : (6) The bundles wcrc 
gcnt.1- led in mmputcr and of'fcrcd Tor hidding to short listcd f inancial  
insli tut ions and mutual funds. Thcse institutions wcrc allowcti to unbundle 
I hem i ~nd  x l l  individually in the stock exchange; and(7) TIie pricing 
hrrnulu adoptcd Ibr the rcl'crl-al pricc was avcrage Net Assel Valuc und 
thc Rnli t Eiirjiing Capaci~y Value 1ne1 hods. 
(3ivestiturc up to 20 per ccnt 03' tllc shrtre cap~t ib l  he ld  by ihc 
govcl-nine111 in 30 eutclpr i \cs was donc in  two phi~scs in Uccemhcr 199 1 
and Fchruary 1992 ensuring that tE~c povcrnmcnl's equity wcluld not Fall 
b c l o w  5 1 pcr ccnr. Suhscqucntly there wcrc dive.;titu~cs in 1992-93, 1993- 
44, 1 r104-95 and 1995-96. More or less the samc prclccdurc was l'ollowcd 
amount of cril icisnl< fro111 cvcn govcrn~ncnt ; i l  agencics such as lhc 
10 Tlic rr:bco~! frv. sg:lli ti: s11:lir.c in huntllcr ratlicr lllnll s~ngly i v ; ~  IWC:ILIEL: il ~$a\ 1.H;~iyd 
t11:11 it'equity of  intliuidunl PSLs n.;~.; ~livcsrc{l hcpar,itcly. itlcli 0111y ilw Y U I ~  pooil 111:ly 
tw ~)ivlcrl up rv i i l i  riynifiCalill! Imwr price\ :liid ~~vssitdc nil t;ll;cl* li,~. IIW :~ntl 
:I\,LT:I;!C PSEs Si~ice \$ idci. p i~~i ic ip;~i io[~ n  llSE equi~y W;I< at) i ~ ~ t ] x > t ~ : ~ n [  objcc~it~c of 
ilrc policy i t  wm li4k t l ~ ; ~ t  ir wac i r l~pu~ l : i~~ i  to ullcurc t l~nl :iwide InuFc uol' PSE s11ii1rx 
I\-crc. ckt i l ;c ly [lit-erlcd. Hc.ii~r. lllc cnrl.;cirius tltcisitr~i lo ~ c l l  il t ~ i ~ ~ i ~ l l ~ s .  SCC Ihr I'tlII 
1 ~ x 1  01' lllc ~l lcc~: l l  ~tiildc hy lhcli F u ~ u c c  Ministci in l l ~ e  K:~iyn S;!hl>:~ (111 6-OR- 19')3 
while initr:~i ly tl~t. tIlcl\n~c :II tlw cnllir~y :~ \~r r ) t iu l~  l c~~ion 011 thc ruh,juct" S~fu:ltioti 
a~isiag nu1 c>C lal;*z fc~ lc  di\,rQii~111 ill P t ~ h l i ~  Sector (!n~l~'~~aLi~i:,li". SLY A ~ ~ m h : i ~ i l  
1093b), p. K57 
Comptroller and Audilor General" . I will be raking up lhese in the 
subsequent suh section. In  1993-94 !he government appointed a 
committee under the chairmanship o f  Professor Rangarajan known as 
the Commt3tee on Disinvestment of Slmes in Ptiblic Sector E~~rerpriscs. 
The report covered various aspects of divestiture such as criteria for 
cleclion of PSEs fordivc$iirurc, nudu.7-opel.cmdi of divestiture, criteria 
for valuation of shares, target clicntelc for divestiturc and other issues. 
The main recommenda!ions of the Committee arc summarised in Table 3. 
lbble3: Main Recommendations of the Committee on Disinvestment 
of shares in PSEs 
I I Sce ChG Hepon Nu: I ?  ollW.7. 
Recommendation 
Limit of equity to be dibcsted 
Crileria for Valualion of shares 
Scope 
In gcneral, the percentage af 
quity to be disinvestd should bc 
under 49% in industries reserved 
for public seclor and over 74% in 
nther cases. 
The discounted cast1 flow mclhod 
is preferred. Each entcrprisc 
would nced lo hc studicd 
c;rrcfull y laking into account 
factors such as value of assets, its 
nlarkct share, potential profit 
carning capacity and thc 
prevailing price in the markc1 for 
shansoTsimilar entcrpriscs in thc 
private sccloc 
Source: Assochnm ( l993a), pp-73 1-32. 
Preparatory s(eps 
Modus uperandi of divcstnicnt 
Standing Comrnittce on Public 
Enterprise Divestrncnt 
Thc Rcport was suhinitted to the Ministry of Finance in April I993 
hut rt is feared that llle recommcndntions havc no1 yct heen adoplcd hy 
I h e  government". Finally i n  the huclget sptcch of 1996-97 the 
govcrnrilen1 hits approved the proposal to cstahlish a t3isinvcstn-icnt 
Cornrnir;sion which will be chargcd will1 the respunsihility oftnklng any 
decision wll h rcspcc t 10 ciivesliture irr rr f r  utrspcirr t i~  ttrclrrtler.. Hut. from 
uurrent press rcpur1s, the commission i s  ycl tu ~slke off". 
Tliesc includc conversion into 
company form, deciding the 
desirable levels of cquily and 
rch~ructuring the financial aspcas 
with a properdehtlequity gearing 
Once a reasonahlc market price 
is es~ahlished in a nonnn! lrading 
atmosphcrc ovcr a reasonable 
period of timc, the fixed price 
method would bc appropriate. 
Creation of ~ h c  Standing 
C o m m i t ~ c c  ttl recommend 
enterprise -specific action for 
reforms, rcslructuring ant1 
divestment as well a5 monitoring 
and evalualing [he process of 
implcmcnlntion 
I ?  See Cliupl-a. Ajai 21 dl( 1995). p. hfi 
13 F r o t ~ ~  c~ll.rcc.l~t ~liscuhiions il i:. Ir:lrvd 1h;rt the Cutn~ni>sia~~ with olic I'ull lirlit: Ch;~ii-~u;~n 
:uld l i l u~  11:11.[ l i r ~ i c  IIICIII~CIS is very like1 y to :n t l~c  MRTFC u;ly il\ i l c  advice is ullly 
i-ecnrlilllk ~~~ l ; i tu ry  in I1:ttulr. I3ut nil alra ill ~ l ~ i c l i  the Comn~issic>n llns sho\{,li ~ 1 1 1 1 ~  
lrllpact i> , ini1i:ltill:: 3 widcr dcl>alt.. alllung ;ll! cuncc~rled, 011 ~cvctal ~SEULG 
~oniteu~etk i: 11 11 ~~VCFIIII'I~I S U C I I  :I< l~c !~-~~ctu i - ing  of PSEs hufojc p~,itnlixalinn allti on 
Ihc ~i~eth~)(ld$lngirs to he i~doptud foi, the optir11;11 v;~luntio~~ of  he PSE rllnrc5. 
Though there has hecn several rounds of divestiture during the 
period 199 1-92 through 1995-96, major divestiture took place only in 
199 1-92. See Tahlc 4 Lbr a summary picture. 
Table 4: Summary of PSE Divestment, 1991 -92 to 1995-96 
equity inper 0.12to 0.11to .()It0 
divesled cenl 20.00 10.00 18.57 23.1 
Note: 1.  Figurcs in brackets indicate the extent or short fall, i n  per 
cent, OF actual proceeds comprcd with their respective targets. 
Source: Government of India{ 1995-96), p. 12 1 
Mohrln ( 1996), p. 80 
Altogelher gavurnment's equity ranging fmm *s little as 0.26 to 
43.1 has been sold involving 40 cnrcrprises(Annexure ). The only two 
enterprises wherc the government equiry has comc down to 
:p 
. . 
cent mark are the two refineries, Madras and Cochin. Bolh these, i n  any 
case. had government equity holding of only 85 and 61 per cent 
respectively in 199 I. The very sharp increases in [he average price per 
sharc i n  1993-94 and 1994-95 werc con~rihuted by the very high average 
per sharc obta~ncd by two enterprises namely Hindustan Petroleum (Rs 
1260.0 1 ) in 1993-94 and ONGC (Rs 1535.0) in 1994-95. Five major 
infcrcnces can he drawn horn Ihe divestiturc exercise. 
The first i:; tha! only in IWO enterprises (namely in HPCL and 
B X L )  that thc exLen t of divestiture exceeds 40 pel- cent of government's 
equity. At lcasl in haIf'thc number ofcnlcrprises the divestiture works 
out to less lhan 10 per ccnl. See Figure 1 .  
Distribution of PSlk according to thc cstetlt ordivcstiture 
VtrnY. W W W  P W f l  mL,a P C P  
Size Ulasseq 
Figure t 
Second!y even though there has hccn shedding of govern tncn 1's 
cquiry the cfl'ccrive control and managemen1 of [he enterprises still lic 
with thc govaninent. Thirdly, only In thrce cnterpriscs that the divcstilure 
took plilce in  rhl.cc of the five ycil~-s". ForrsthIy, \he bundling of sharcs 
14 They :ilt DHBL. Hindu?r;~n Petrolr>cunr nnd SAIL 
in 19!4 1-92 generally sought to depress the price of all the enterprises 
across the board. This i s  brought by the, very sharp increases in prices of 
a11 the prices in 1992-93 (Figure 2) when the shares wcre unbundled and 
sold to the general public as well. 
Figure 2 
Finally, most of the divestet[ cotnpanics, with sonlc minor 
exceptions, are rhc mosi pmfitahlc and dividend paying co~npnnics lo 
the exchequer. In  fact thcy togcthcr contributed on an averyc 85 per 
cent of the total dividend paid by all PSEs during thc Iast three ycars 
(Table 5).  
Tahle 5: Share of Divested PSKs in Total Dividend paid hy All B E s  
(Rs in Miltion) 
Year 
Source: Anncxure 2 
1992-93 
I 09 3-94 
This raiscs  he issue tliu~ For some current revenue thc government 
is going lo lonsc future yield of' dividend from tlrcse entcrpri~cs Zn thc 
exicnl that thu govcrnmcnt equity svands rcduccd. Qt~esiions have also 
hcen w i d  as lo ihc healrh OF the pri1nal.y market, namcl y that i t  was nor 
gnod enough fo r  JivcsBtrrtrc. This  docs not q p a r  to he a ptausiblc reason 
hccause thc prlbIic issucs Izlunchcd by privatc sector enterprises have 
rcgistcrcd significanl incrcascs during ~ h c  period consequent to the 
ah11 ition of rhe Controller or Capital Issucs which eavc ircedom [o thc 
All PSEs 
scc~cw intcrms or pricing and the quanlity to he raiwdI5. 
Divested Enterprises 
Notc: Figures in hrackcts indicitle percentage shnrc or ill1 PSEs. 
7916 
10145 
Divestiture proceeds 
6787 (86) 
8735 (86) 
The ~tlnin purposeof divestiture is to rilise rcvcnuc h r  thc hudget. 
But even rrrm this narrow obicclire, thc tlivcatiturc has fallcn strort r ,C 
I5 For i~!sf:~nct.. i l ~ r  public i>sucs[hufh ~ r lu i t y  311d d c k n ~ ~ l ~ t s )  regis~cltd 3n inc~rast' ( ~ f  
I9 I. 31 alirl 36 per cent in 1982-93. 1993.94 3nd 1994-95 ~aspeclivcly. See 
Gfl\.ernurrll of lndia ( 1W5-90). p. 120 
Ihc targered amount in ,/birr of the livc years and (fiat loo by a wide 
marsin. See Figure 3 .  
The Extent of shortfall or Excess in Actual 
Divestiture Proceeds(%) 
Figure 3 
It iqsecn that only in one of ihc five yen~w. nn~iicly in 1991 -02 ~ h n t  
thc acrunl proocedq hnvc cxcccc\cd the ~mgcted arnounl. But it  is shown 
by the CAC that [hat the government could havc stiU obtained much 
hiehcr proccctls had thcy priced rhe shares prclprly. Consequent lo this 
ir!lll?np~r. pr- ir i~~~q h e  exchequer has lost a large sum of mnncy. T l ~ e  n1.e 
V ~ L ~ ~ O U S  cst i~natcq of this so called improper pricing. But 1 rcs~rict in ysell 
10 hasing thc discussions on thc ofricial coniputalions or it by the CAG. 
Sec Tahle 6. 
Nofe: Figures in hracke~s indicake thc per ceniagc of loss to 1 1 1 ~  
Table ri: Extent of to the Gowernnlent in the Divestiture of 1991-92 
govcrnllienl 
Source: Comptroller and Auditor Gcaeral( 1993), p. 47 
7. HMT 
8. Shll. 
9. RCPI, 
10. NLC 
This shows [hat loss to the exchequer hx! hccn con~iderahlc'~. 
V;ridyiilI(1'35) has provided somc alte~.nalc eslimates of the exlent of loss 
18.1 I 
13.24 
9.87 
1 1.46 
suffered in  z hc 199 ! -92 divestiture. Hc also csr imatcd that Iosses wcre 
76.25 (321.011) 
60.62 (2 17.22) 
4 8 . 0  (.W.26) 
sz.oa (615.531 
- 
16 3-t~ir paint is cl:iboaitrcl f'ulilirl- ill hl:i~li(lYY-I) and M:~lii( 1005). 
made in the suhsequcnt salcs though its cxtcnt had been reduced, Ir i s  
significant that the undervaluatiotl of shares happened despitc the 
government rcceiving expert advice cln va1u;uion from onc of the best. 
internationally known, private consu ltancy l i rnls" '. 
Further there was also tlo "claw back" provision which would 
havc granted ~ h c  govcnlrncni with an opportuaily Fur sharing in any 
profits which successful biddctes may rcccivc consecjucnl to their on ward 
sale of  shares. The CAG also pointed nut nurnhcr oi'cither irregillnrities 
in !he salc Ix  . The practise of using ;I capital receipt like thc divcsrirure 
proceeds t o  meel parria!ly revenue cxpentli turc and the lcvcls oircvenuc 
expenditure nnl having hcen tcduccd .the objective of raising non 
inflalionnry resources was also not ach~evcd. During ~ h c  entire period 
divcstilurc prt~ced accounred fur a m a e  4.36 per cent of thc fiscal 
deficit1'. See Table 7. 
17 Thc un~ lc rp r i c i~ lg  o f  PSE shares is so lnc~in lc \  r l isr i i is~etl  trl' as nn i nev i~uh lc  
cn~~scquc~~cc  o i  tllc ~ ~ u t i p l e x i t i r s  i l i v ~ l v ~ d  ill i ls  pricing. Even i n  llir UK w l w e  #he 
privnlivation cxcrciw ir gelitrally hailetl ns n succc\a story, t h c ~ c  l ~ a v r  h e n  instibnucs 
of ~ r n s s  iil1d~11~~111uxtitl11 S~IIII~:IT ~ X P C I . ~ C * ~ C C . L ~  Ijilkt: IXCII r~l )o l l tx \  FFUI tIw\t.lle~rt in 
Eu1,ope. Ttlc i]riccliuti 01  II<~v In pricc u:lnditl;ilc~ l'ur ~>riv:lli%nlitln wi l l  I)c rdihcd l i ~ \ l c  
anda~ain. Rui ~ l l i h  qucs~iun has IW c : q  :ms\vrr. W l i r ~ i  np r c r l l l i c l l l  e t r ;  ;1 p'icr Fc11- 
;I PSE. ir is rl yinp l o  s;ll i i iy pcttplr: rvirh ;I va~iv ly  o r  icllcl,csr%: inslilutinnnl ;~ntl  retail 
invt'htr,rs. I U X P ~ ~ I - Y .  [he c o ~ ~ p l n y ' s  t.111p1oyc~'; :~nd. not Ic:ir;t. i t \  nlanagcrs. These 
inicresls oftclr ctjrlf Ilc!. See Ecanc>~~iicl ( 190(7). pp. 9'1- 100. 
1g .kc CAC;I 1092]. pp. 10-48 ior t lw dt.l:~ils. 
Iq Gouri (lYr461 atktl  iiiakc\ this point. Sut p. M-M 
Table 7: Fiscal I)cficit. Hcven~ie Deficit end I)ibediturc I'rocceds, 
199192 to 1995-96 (Us ~ I I  bIillion) 
3554 10l BE) 
- I 
Tlic I h h l c  lllus c o n l i r r n s  lhc view ~hihl cccn iIs n 1~~~sorrrr.p-r71j,si11~p 
r:vrrr,ist!. ~ l i c  divcstil t11.c prhoccss h;~s hccn. hy r~rld large. ;I Liilurc. F u r ~ l w ,  
rhc silu nl' PSE st\a~.cs Iwiug lirni[ctl lu a nun~hc~*(~I '  I'inancii~l iiisritutir~nsl 
rnr~lual i ' i~nds/mc~~i~l~;~nl  hitllks excluding ~ l i c  worhkcrr/cml?loyccs ol' IIIC 
I'SE?: illat the ~CIICI.~! I > E I I I I ~ ~  c t i~~ l t l  i1150 no[ lw c~~ i s i t l c r e~ i  ils wi(tc1- ~,ithlic 
po~'lii.il~;ilion ils i [  ivas clailncd in  thc new ii1tlur;Iri;rl poIiuy staIciucn1. 
Ttic policy orr thc usc of rhc clivcs~itul-e prcrccils tiits undergone s o ~ l ~ c  
cliangc I'voln rhc 1,rcjprlscrl cli\:cali~ II-c  of  l 90h .  0 7 .  Tlw Fit1anc.c h4inistc1- 
in his I~iitlgcl spccch li)r 1990-97 h;\s w id  thn~  tllc proceeds will hc uiiliscti 
fnt. ;rlIocnlions Ihrcd is ! i t~n i ~ i d  hcaltli ill h;~ckw;~r.rl a ras anrl i i ~ ro ' c ; i l i n~  
:I f i ~ ~ > c i  10 s l ~ c n y h c n  puhlic scclor cn~c~-priscs. I~OWCV~I~ 11icrc i s  no 
111cli11 ion or i~ in ific twrd~c! SIICCT~ (11' (997-98. 
F i ~ n c i i ~ l  pcrfornzancc cd the divtsted entcl.l)rises. 
sotnc divestiture in 199 1-92. 1 computed ose Incastire of proli~ahility. 
namely the ratc or' nct pnbli~ margin( net protiunct sales* IM)) during 
three years prior to divcstiture(l989-90 HI 1990-9 I ) and threc ycars pus1 
divest iture(l49 1 -9210 1993-94). See Tahlc 8. No atlcmpt is made lo arrive 
a1 a weighted avcragc for the cnrirc sample as data on weighrs(share of 
each enterprise in the total divestiture proceeds was nat immediately 
available). 
Table 8: Financial Performance of Divcstetl Enterprises, Pre and 
Post Divestiture 
Noie: Thc tirnts arc an;rngctl in n dcscertding order acco~dins lo ttlc 
cxtcnr of divcs~i~ul.e.  
Source: Cornpu~cd horn d;~ra pinviclcd in I3PE , V;trious issucs. 
NFI.C 
FACT 
DRCI. 
M MTC 
-. 
IRCON 
The is rcry sevcnlinp. Excepti11g Ibr. 9 enlcrpri\cs, tllc 
pe~l'onu;u~cc hits nclually tlnurior;~lcrt uouscqucnr to tlivcairurc. I or 
course rk, not alli-i bt~tc illis wotscni ng c1f1' 10 jusl ~livcst i~urc. AII tllnt t~nc 
can say i\ 1ll;u '11 Icast i n  rhe shorr lesm rhcre ih only ;I worccniny dcspilc 
11iz cxistcnoc or ;I ~ ~ u m h c r  ol'lwrfurt~urnre rtrlrcr~rci~~g ~ ~ ~ r ~ r r s r r r r s  sucl~ as 
[lie MoUs etc. 
1 .01  
1.30 
22.9 
44.97 
-905.74 
6.40 
2.86 
16.47 
1.43 
-2207.51 
SOCIAL SAFETY NET AND PRl\'ATTSATION 
An i~nporlant conseyucnce of privatisazion and orher cnlcrprisc 
reform rne~lsurcs is the rationulisa~ion of  the workforce: tllc workforce 
is normally retfuccd. This is b : ~ d  on the assumption that thc PSEs are 
usually ovemannctl though cnlclprisc-wisc cst imates of rhe exlcnr or 
ovcrrnanning are rirrd y availrthle. Thc one \vily of m i l i p t i  ng EIlc 
sulTerings or the workfoirc rhal i s  likely la hc shed is to havc n cretiiblc 
social safety nt.1 by which rhc nffereclcd lahnur could he coinpcnsatcd at 
Icast financially. It is against (hi.; hackground lhnt rhu c-nlral gcovcnlmenl 
has intnwluced thc concept of a National Re~rewal F1md(lVRF). Thc 
Fund was estahlishctl it1 Fchruilry, 1992 supp~scdly la '- In prorn.1 lhc 
intcrcsts of workers :~ll'ccicd hy modcn~isat ion, technology upgiad;i~ion 
and iulustrial rerrl.c~clui-ing-". Thc specitic ohjcutic.cs af rhc NRF; arc to 
pmvidc3': (! ) assistance to firnis ro cover r lsc cost\ of =training :md 
redeployn~enr of cntployces arising rls a resulf of modcrnisarion and 
tcchnologicill upgrntlntion of cxisting capacilics vtitl Imti~ induslrir~l 
rcslrucruring(x 1 ): (2) fuunds Tor cornpensalion to crnployecs ;iTl'cclcd hy 
reslrucr~ring nr clo~urc oC intlu.;ti-in! unirs. both in Ihc pllhliv ;~nd ~ ~ r i v a ~ c  
scclors (x2); ;ual 13) h n d s  for clnplopn~cnl gcncriuion schemc:, in ho~h 
thc ~ r ~ i ~ n i s c d  and UII(H ganised seczors(x3). An idol1 or n cirdihlc social 
safety ncr sliould havc a cot-pus ol' funds sulliuicnrl y lorgc unough fa 
finance adrqua!c.l y thc tllrcc ccmlutncnls. 
However righi through inccplinn rhc NRIT got ~lmrowlp ctluiited 
will1 mcctin~ cxlwediturc on Vnl~ull;iry Kcf ircmcnt SCIICIII~(VKS) ol' 
ccnlral PSEs alonc2I  . The laoin criticism ngains~ this Fund is thar thcre 
is prccious li111e discussion wirhin government circles as to w h a t  should 
he lhc ideal size nT this fund tn cfl'ectivcly rehabilitate thc affcctcd 
wotkfol-ce rrom nor only ccntral  PSEs hul also Sate lcvel PSEs and ihc 
privnlc scutor as well" . This is clearly hnrnc our hy Ihl: lnct that in 1'392- 
93 agairlsl a burIgc~;l~-y ~)rou~sion of Rs 20UO million, Rs 8297 million 
was i~clually spcllr and in the suhseqi~en~ pear againsl a provision or Rs 
7000 mil11011 Ihc ac~uiil spending Rs 10200 million. Thiq clcial y shows 
the NKF is naL adcquatcty fur~cled. In facl thcre is nu i'u~icl as such and 
i l  is pulAely bawd on an year to year a!localion. Tlris can he ~ztugcd from 
the budgevary allocaiion Ibr 1993-94 ttr~d lY94-95. Scc E ~ h l c  9. 
Tablc 9: Allocatian under the NRF (Rs in Million) 
Sourrc: DPE ( 1993-94).p. 1 Y5- 19h. 
Partic~~lars 
-. 
VRS in Central PSEs 
Worker's Compc~~sa[ io~~  
p:lyrncnt in case 0 1 '  
closurc/l~chnh~lil;~~ion 
and VRS in Shtc PSEs 
IVor.hc~-'s Counselling nrld 
11 is sccn that II~LICII of II is lis tllc ~ c ~ n l ~ r i a l  p; ylncllls unJc.1- 111c 
VRS schcnlc alone. Re~raining ctc. Iiii\ take11 the lowcst priorily. III I-3~1 
2 1  Thc \'KS II;I\ f r e e ~ ~  in ~\istullct. si~tcc IOXI-Xi) ill r.rhltr:ll PSEu. A t ~ u ~ l t  00.0[1(1 
c~npltryucr haw upictl h r  ~ ~ L ~ ~ L ' I ~ K ' I I I  iiq111cr I ~ C  CCIIL'HK' 1 -~11 \1  ILJS'J-YO ro i'F12-'11. 
Set 1WE 1.1092-941. p !53, 
199.7-94(Actual) 
11300 
I400 
21 For an c?;u~riw ill this di l rcr io~~.  wv 51a11i4 1 W-I). 
1994-Yj(Budgeted) 
SHOO 
1500 
-- 
Rari~ining plnpt:unmc SO0 I.. 500 
ir is seen [hat a soad nurnhr  of the elnployces of the cen~nl PSEs who 
have opted for the VRS are the younger and qualified oncs who inturn 
have sought e~~lployrnenl in Ihe privufe secror2>. Second. much of the 
VRS cxpenditurc has h e n  concentrated in rhe h a v y  induslry and ~cxtilc 
sectors. See Table 10. 
Tabte 10: Industry-wise Distribution of Expenditure under the VRS 
(Rs in Million) 
Petrochemicals 
9. Civil Supplies and 
Tlcan he argued that with the implemcntntion of Ihlc \chcmc uiidc~ 
[he currcnt procedure. it can he argucd ihal ilic Indian t'S13s arc going to 
loosc their hcsl men to the private sector. And ;IS seer1 etlrlicr i n  oui. 
dr~oussion or [he divestiture process thc govcrnrrlcnl i \  gwnp 10 louse i ~ s  
better performing cnlcrpriws loo. So a1 111e end ui' t he (lily. the povel.nmcnt 
is going Lo be left with mostly the lcss prorilahlc and loss making 
cnterpriscs and ~ h i c h  arc likely to exert  a gre;lter drag on its hudgc~.  If 
th'lt happen3, it would go a long way towards v~l~ating ~ h t  very purposc 
o f  Ihe i efuim process. 
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Annexure 1 
The Extent of Divestiture(%) 
Name of 
Enterprise 
u r n  
HOCL 
BEML 
P C L  
MTNL 
BPCL 
M Refi nerics 
BHEL 
IDBI 
B Refineries 
H Zinc 
BEL 
Container Co 
IT1 
scz 
VSNL 
CMC 
NALCO 
Hinduslan Photo 
SAlL 
lTDC 
HMT 
STC 
lndian Oil 
Andrew Yule 
Extent of 
Divestiture 
49.00 
43.10 
39.92 
38.57 
34.27 
33.8 
32.82 
32.28 
27.86 
25.53 
24.93 
24.1 4 
23-08 
22.63 
i9.88 
17.98 
16.69 
12.85 
12.53 
1 1.07 
10.03 
9.BS 
8.98 
8.84 
8.50 
Before 
Divestiture 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
84.62 
Current 
Position 
5 L 
56.9 
60.08 
61.43 
65.73 
66.2 
5 1.8 
100 
100 
100 
IC)O 
100 
100 
99.65 
rm 
100 
100 
100 
l a) 
190 
100 
100 
100 
49.88 
7 1.3 
67.72 
72.14 
74.47 
75.07 
75.86 
76.92 
77.02 
80.12 
82.02 
83.3 1 
87.1 5 
87.47 
88.93 
89.97 
90.32 
9 1.02 
91.04 
62.80 
No!c: Bcfore Di vus!irut.c-as on 3 1/E)3/199 J and Curre111 Position -as 
1)ividends paid by t hc Privatised 1\1hlic ,%tor E:ntcrprist5 (Rs in C'rnm) 
- 
3.50 
25.54 3 1.02 
27.0 37 52 40.7 
MTNL 
10.5 10.5 
23 07 28.5: 28 53 
UHEI.  36.7 1 36.71 3h.7 1 
U Rcfinc~.ior; 9.99 13.98 
7.40 
671 
6.!2 
5.99 
3.37 
2.35 
3.88 
2.03 
1.62 
1.42 
t .31 
1.12 
0.97 
0.67 
0.26 
Cochin Kcfincl-ies 
Engineen Inrlia 
GAII,  
NFI, 
OMGC 
I4C1, 
NMDC 
I>rcdgir~g Co1-1w)r 
FACT 
l l i ~ ~ r l u s ~ a ~ j  (:oppcs 
Kudermuk h 
MMTC 
IRI'ON 
- 
100 
103 
61.16 
lo0 
I no 
100 
I OU 
1 IN) 
100 
I00 
98.69 
lo0 
I (Jo 
I CX) 
IW) 
- 
92.60 
93.29 
55.04 
94.0 J 
96.63 
97.65 
96. I 2  
97.97 
98.38 
9K.M 
97.35 
98.8X 
99.03 
99.33 
99.74 
-- P 
Annexun. 2 (conrd .......) 
BEL 
H Zinc 
Container Co 
IT1 
SCI 
CMC 
VSN t 
NALCO 
Hindustan Phoro 
SAIL 
ITDC 
HMT 
STC 
Andrew Yule 
RCFL 
Cochin Refineries 
Engineers India 
NLC 
Indian Oil 
GAIL 
NFL 
ONGC 
HCL 
NMDC 
D d g i n g  Corpr  
FACT 
Hinduslan Copper 
Kudcrmu kh 
MMTC 
IKCON 
I Total for tlw above 
1 Total for all PSEs 
Source: DPE, Various Issucs. 
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